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Irregular migration from Africa across the Mediterranean to the EU has become a central policy issue. 
While the establishment of a Libyan SAR zone and of a Libyan coast guard has lowered the numbers 
crossing the Mediterranean since mid-2017, there are strong concerns about the sustainability of the 
current approach and its reliability given the severe political instability in Libya. Due to this state of 
affairs, increasing legal access to the EU – for study and work purposes – has re-appeared on the 
European agenda as one potential way to reduce irregular crossing in the future. This comes at a time 
where legal access to the EU labour markets for African citizens has been steadily reduced. Moreover, 
actions aimed at streamlining access to existing pathways for legal migration, or opening new ones, 
can be used as lever in improving cooperation in migration management with countries of origin when 
it comes to returns and readmissions.  
We review the evidence bearing on to what extent increasing legal access via labour migration is 
effective in reducing irregular migration. While our focus is on irregular crossings of the 
Mediterranean, we draw on evidence from different world regions. We conclude that increasing legal 
pathways for migration from Africa to Europe, in itself, will have only a limited effect on the number 
of people trying to cross irregularly. Substitution can take place only if expansion of legal pathways – 
tailored to labour market needs and migrant profiles – is envisaged in a comprehensive policy mix 
including strong enforcement of migration legislation (i.e. control of employers at destination together 
with border control) and streamlining of recruitment procedures. 
 
 
The Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM) is a Research Alliance formed by CEPS with the Kiel Institute for 
the World Economy and the Migration Policy Centre (MPC). The three research institutes join forces here to address the 
most relevant research questions and pressing concerns arising from asylum and migration in Europe.  
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1 Introduction1 
The increasing migration pressure from Africa over the past five years has turned the Mediterranean 
into a deadly migration route. Reasons and incentives to make the dangerous crossing have shifted 
over time. More people now undertake the perilous journey in order to achieve better economic and 
social conditions in Europe. Indeed, from 2016 onwards, people with little chance of obtaining 
international protection overtook nationals of countries with high recognition rates in total arrivals in 
the EU (Figure 1).  
On the other side of the Mediterranean, the scarce availability of regular opportunities for work 
migration has significantly reduced the likelihood of ever entering the EU legally for a considerable 
number of migrants from Africa. Since 2008, the first year for which EU-wide data are available, first 
time permits for occupational reasons issued to African citizens decreased by more than 65%, from 
125,000 to 41,000 in 2017 (Figure 2).  
The current situation is untenable and several policy ideas aimed at lowering incentives for irregular 
migration from Africa to the EU have been put forward in order to improve overall migration 
management between Africa and Europe. These include: 1) strengthening border controls, 2) 
tightening entry requirements and asylum policies, and 3) opening up more legal pathways, which 
should substitute for irregular migration. 
Figure 1 Irregular border crossings to the EU by 
African nationals 
Figure 2. First time permits for occupational 
reasons issued to African citizens by the EU28 
  
Note: The number of irregular crossings by individuals 
who are non-eligible for protection is calculated by 
applying the EU-average rates of first instance recognition 
for the period 2016-17 to irregular crossings by nationals 
from all African countries. Figures cover all migrations 
routes as categorised by Frontex. 
Source: Own elaboration based on Frontex and Eurostat 
data. 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat. 
 
 
                                                          
1 We thank Nadzeya Laurantsyeva, Matthias Lücke and Tobias Stöhr for many useful comments and discussions on earlier 
drafts. 
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While significant steps forward have been taken in the framework of the first two policy options, very 
little has been done to broaden the scope of labour immigration. Yet, there have been several calls 
for increasing the number of legal pathways for labour migration to the EU, both for protection – 
through resettlement – and for work migration (MEDAM, 2018). For instance, the European 
Commission has been active in setting up pilot projects for work migration with the support of private 
stakeholders and interested member states (EC 2017, 2018). In the same way, United Nations 
Secretary-General António Guterres called for the enhancement of legal pathways for regular 
migration (as well as for regularisation of irregular migrants in the territory of UN member states) (UN, 
2017a), and the importance of regular channels for work migration is also underlined in the Global 
Compact for Safely and Orderly Migration (UN, 2017b).  
In this Policy Insight we review the available evidence on the extent to which expanding work and 
study opportunities2 for Africans could help in reducing irregular migration across the Mediterranean. 
2 On the link between regular and irregular migration 
To what extent can widening opportunities to migrate legally (for work and study purposes) substitute 
for and thus reduce irregular crossing from Africa to the EU? To answer this question, we draw on 
available evidence from the existing literature, taking different world regions, types of legal pathways, 
and methodological approaches into consideration.  
2.1 What does the theory tell us? 
From a theoretical perspective of maximising utility, expanding the opportunities to migrate regularly 
can be seen as lowering the costs of regular migration relative to the cost of migrating irregularly. Two 
main effects on migration can be derived from such a framework: first, some irregular migrants will 
prefer to migrate regularly (depending on preferences, and profile of expected earnings, which may 
differ for legal migration), but not all may be able to (depending on, for example, whether their skills 
are matched to the job offer); and, second, the lower cost of regular migration will induce more people 
to want to migrate regularly. Hence, expanding legal migration pathways will have a negative effect 
on the number of people attempting irregular migration, but the size of this effect is unclear and 
ultimately an empirical question.3  
In more elaborate theoretical frameworks, Djajić and Vinogradova (2019), and Auriol and Mesnard 
(2016) are able to illustrate the effect of different policy instruments in the richer setting of the 
migration decision-making process. Auriol and Mesnard (2016) combine visa policy (i.e. application 
fees) with enforcement of migration legislation to estimate the potential role of markets and prices in 
putting human smugglers out of business. With their parametrisation (for migration in East Asia), the 
authors find that a 250% increase in the marginal cost of migrating – generated, for instance, by a 
tightening of border controls – would be necessary to dismantle the smuggling business while keeping 
migration constant. A 50% decrease in the implicit earnings of irregular migrants driven by, for 
instance, tightening control of employers would lead to the same result. Moreover, Auriol and 
Mesnard (2016) show that these costs to curb irregular migration decrease relative to the probability 
of deportation, thus highlighting the complementarity among these different types of policy 
                                                          
2 The focus of this paper is on pathways for work migration and education rather than for humanitarian reasons such as 
resettlement programmes. 
3 This is under the reasonable assumption that a (marginal) increase in regular migration does not affect the number of 
people initially attempting irregular migration (e.g. via expanding diaspora effects). 
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measures. The authors’ recommendations thus stress the importance of a calibrated use of 
government funds across different policy interventions – both for the external and internal dimension 
– aimed at fighting irregular immigration: discrepancies in budgetary terms in favour of border 
controls over sanctions for employers of irregular migrants and deportation hamper the effectiveness 
of government migration policy.  
These results point to the importance of complementarity between policies in effectively curbing 
irregular migration, both in terms of border crossings and of the population residing irregularly in the 
country.  
2.2 The (scarce) empirical evidence for the EU 
While there are a number of studies looking at how visa and other immigration policies affect regular 
immigration (e.g. Czaika and de Haas, 2014; Ortega and Peri, 2013), empirical studies looking at the 
relationship between regular and irregular migration into the EU are relatively scarce.4 Czaika and 
Hobolth (2014) provide one of the few examples related to the EU using a cross-national dataset of 
asylum applications and short-term visa refusals for 29 European destination countries. Their results 
show that a 10% increase in the asylum refusal rate increases the number of (apprehended) irregular 
migrants by 3%, while a 10% increase in short-stay visa restrictions (measured by visa refusal practices) 
has a stronger impact of around 5%.  
These results show that restricting legal access can divert migratory flows towards irregularity. Still 
this evidence does not imply, first, that the opposite would be true and, second, that widening legal 
access alone would be enough to decrease irregular crossing. Indeed, it is important to consider 
synergies with other policy areas (e.g. border control, deportation, control of employers) to 
understand where and when widening legal access can effectively reduce incentives for irregular 
crossing.  
2.3 Lessons from the US-Mexico border 
Complementarity of migration policies has had a significant role in curbing irregular migration at the 
US-Mexico border over the years. At the same time, single policy interventions did very little by 
themselves to decrease irregular crossing.   
Different studies show how border militarisation (started in 1986) resulted mostly in higher costs, both 
monetary and humanitarian in terms of an increased death rate, rather than in a significant reduction 
in irregular crossing into the US (Massey et al., 2016; Gathmann, 2008). Alternatives for re-routing 
available for migrants on the one side, and the significant wage differential (compensating for 
additional costs deriving from stricter controls) on the other side are the two main reasons for the 
insignificant deterrence effect of the border build-up in curbing irregular migration from Mexico 
(Gathmann, 2008).  
                                                          
4 There is a related strand of literature looking at the effect of immigration policies on the composition of the stock migrants 
(e.g. Czaika and de Haas, 2017). 
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Moreover, increasing risks and costs coupled with the prospect of never being able to re-enter the 
destination country made it impossible to plan 
for short-term and circular migration 
experiences (Massey et al., 2016), which 
pushed migrants already present in the US to 
overstay with respect to their intention.5 
Yet, substitution between irregular and regular migration did take place at the US-Mexico border over 
the last 70 years. Therefore, the question is what factors created the right conditions for substitution 
to happen in the past? 
Clemens and Gough (2018) look at the effects of enlargements and contractions in legal access for 
Mexicans in the US, as well as at the different levels of enforcement of migration legislation put in 
place by the US over the years. The analysis covers the years up to 2016 and goes back as far as 1940 
with the introduction of the Bracero programme.6 Evidence on the substitution between legal and 
irregular access emerges from the early stages of the programme.7 Clemens and Gough (2018) show 
that apprehensions were growing in step with the number of visas (for low-skill seasonal work) issued 
during the first part of the programme, while they dropped immediately in the second phase once the 
number of visas had peaked at more than 400,000.8  
During the first phase, immigration enforcement was low despite high risk for irregularities: for 
instance, employers could not re-hire workers because the latter were assigned from a common 
labour pool. Yet, this did not stop the re-hiring of workers in the black market. In light of this 
unintended effect, between 1954 and 1955, the US government strengthened enforcement (by means 
of both deportations and border control) on the one hand, and widened the scope of the programme 
on the other hand. More precisely, since 1955 US employers could hire named individual workers 
(rather than via a common pool of workers) and renew contracts directly in the US. Irregular 
immigration hit a record low in the ten years following these policy changes,9 as the latter created the 
right incentives for employers to hire legally, whereas strict enforcement at the border as well as on 
work sites lowered incentives to work and hire illegally.  
In other words, the mix of stricter enforcement, the adaptation of the programme itself, and a 
significant number of visas issued, triggered the substitution mechanism between irregular and 
regular migration. 
With the termination of the Bracero programme in 1965, however, legal access for low-skilled 
Mexicans to the US labour market was almost wiped out: the number of visas dropped from 400,000 
per year to close to zero in a matter of five years.10 Together with lower enforcement and increasing 
                                                          
5 de Haas, H. (2011) defines four “substitution effects” in migration patterns that can follow a change in migration policy: 
spatial substitution (across destination countries); categorical substitution (across different entry channels, either legal or 
illegal); inter-temporal substitution (in case of future tightening of migration regulations); and reverse flow substitution 
(when restrictions decrease return migration). 
6 The Bracero programme was started by the US in 1942 to deal with labour shortages in the agriculture sector generated by 
the ongoing war. In the end, the programme lasted until 1964, and each year from 1950, it allowed, on average, 300,000 
Mexicans to work in the US. 
7 I.e. prior to 1953 and between 1954 and 1965, the year when the Bracero programme ended. 
8 Record high since 1940, see Figure A1 in the Annex. 
9 See Figure A1 in the Annex. 
10 Period 1960-1965 in Figure A1 in the Annex. 
“[I]n game theory terms, making temporary 
employment abroad a repeated rather than a one-
shot game changes behaviour and aligns it with the 
intended consequences” Sáez (2013) 
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demographic pressure from Mexico, a significant increase in irregular migration into the US was 
recorded in the period following 1965. .  
Substitution from irregular to regular migration took place after 2001, once again when the US 
government boosted enforcement along with offering easier legal access for seasonal work – by 
facilitating employers’ access to visas and a new fast-track processing option (Clemens and Gough, 
2018). Since 2001, irregular migration has decreased significantly after 40 years of a steady rise. 
As predicted by the theoretical literature, Clemens and Gough (2018) therefore conclude that the 
substitution from irregular to regular migration took place when the US government put in place a mix 
of policies aimed at stepping up both migration enforcement and legal access for (seasonal) work 
migration.  
3 An analysis of the Africa-EU case  
This section assesses, to the extent possible given data limitations, whether or not a substitution 
between irregular and regular migration is taking place in the Africa-EU corridor. We first show a 
descriptive analysis with trends in (first time) permits issued to African nationals for occupational and 
educational reasons on one side, and irregular crossing on the other. This descriptive exercise is then 
supported by an econometric analysis carried out over the same time span (2009-2016) adding 
additional control variables.  
Looking at Africa as a whole, it seems that substitution between the two types of migration from Africa 
into the EU has been taking place since 2010 (Figure 3, upper-left quadrant). In fact, between 2010 
and 2011, 60,000 fewer permits were issued to African citizens for occupational and educational 
reasons, with the downward trend flattening in the following years. Overall, between 2010 and 2016, 
the number of permits issued declined by approximately 90,000 units. Over the same period, irregular 
crossings grew, with a first prominent increase in 2011 (driven most likely by the rise of the Arab 
spring), then intensifying from 2014 onward and overtaking the number of legal permits issued.  
The West African region accounts for the greater part of irregular crossing into the EU from Africa, 
with the share increasing from one third in 2011 to two thirds in 2016. On the other hand, permits 
allotted to West African countries in total permits to Africa have decreased from one third in 2010 to 
one quarter in 2016 (Figure 3, upper-right quadrant). Looking at the main countries of origin of 
irregular crossing, such as Nigeria and Senegal, shows similar trends, particularly for Nigeria where 
permits have halved between 2010 and 2016 (Figure 3, lower-left quadrant). On the contrary, 
substitution did not take place for North African countries, for which the total number of permits in 
2016 is still about 50,000 compared with 19,000 irregular crossings. In fact, despite a decrease in the 
overall number of permits in line with the trend for Africa as a whole, the five North African countries 
still account for 46% of all permits for occupational and educational reasons issued to African citizens 
by the EU.  
Even though the evidence presented in Figure 3 is based on very basic descriptive analysis, it reflects 
trends observed in Clemens and Gough (2018) for the US-Mexico case. Moreover, similar trends are 
also observable within continental Europe when looking at substitution between regular and irregular 
flows of citizens of non-EU countries (e.g. Western Balkans and Belarus) (see Section A2 in Annex). 
Poland and Greece represent the two sides of the story: irregular crossing into Poland started 
decreasing in 2011 when permits allotted to the non-EU citizens concerned began to increase; while 
irregular crossing into Greece from the Western Balkans grew significantly from 2010 after the marked 
dip in permits recorded between 2009 (14,000 permits) and 2012 (less than 250). In destination 
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countries that maintained the number of permits issued constant at low levels, such as Hungary and 
Romania, irregular crossing kept increasing from 2012. 
Figure 3 Evidence of substitution between regular and irregular migration: the case of Africa and the 
EU 
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Notes: a) Permits considered are first residence permits for occupational and educational reasons issued by EU 28; b) 
Irregular crossing covers the three Mediterranean migratory routes (Western, Central and Eastern) as defined by Frontex; c) 
Western Africa group includes: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.  
Source: Own elaboration based on Frontex and Eurostat. 
In support of the descriptive analysis, an econometric exercise is carried out using a panel dataset with 
yearly observations of matched total EU and each individual African country’s regular and irregular 
migration – i.e. first residence permit for occupational and educational reasons and irregular crossings 
in the Mediterranean (see Section A3 in Annex). In addition, the analysis takes into account other 
control variables to capture pull and push factors – such as unemployment rates in EU-15, governance 
indicators, costs for business start-up procedures in the country of origin – and to account for 
differences in development and size of countries – i.e. GNI per capita and population.  
The analysis confirms the main expectation: an increase in the number of permits issued is found to 
be negatively associated with irregular crossing, even after controlling for several other variables. 
Moreover, the coefficient is fairly constant across the different specifications, between -0.12 and -
0.15, implying that an additional 6 to 8 permits would reduce irregular crossings by one person (see 
columns 1 and 2 in Table A1 in Annex). Specifying in terms of percentage changes (i.e. in logarithmic 
form), it emerges that a 1% increase in the number of permits would lead to between 0.47% and 0.51% 
decrease in irregular crossing. At the mean of our sample, this would translate into, on average, a four 
to one ration of permits to irregular crossings. (see columns 3 and 4 Table A1 in Annex).  
    Permits 
    Irregular  
All African countries Western African 
 
Nigeria Senegal 
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4 What does it mean for EU migration policy vis-à-vis Africa? 
What, from the evidence presented so far, especially that on the long experience of migration from 
Mexico to the US, can be applied to Africa-EU migration? 
In comparing Mexico-US migration with Africa-EU migration it is important to keep in mind the 
differences between the two cases, both in topological and enforcement terms. As opposed to 
crossing the US-Mexico land border, irregular crossing into the EU from Africa takes place at sea, 
adding severe operational and humanitarian challenges to border control, but arguably also allowing 
for more effective border control. On the other hand, control of EU external borders is shared among 
different sovereign entities with different procedures and approaches to border management. This 
implies a significant coordination effort and potentially uneven enforcement of border patrolling. 
Nonetheless, as argued by Hanson and McIntosh (2016), differences in the demographic and economic 
characteristics of Africa and EU, as well as access to labour migration, are very similar to those 
characterising the US-Mexico corridor in the 80s. In fact, in the main countries of origin of irregular 
migration to the EU, such as West 
Africa, the fertility rate is between five 
and six children per woman today11 
and access to labour migration in the 
EU for Africans is at historical record 
low.12 
Yet, compared to Mexico, Africa is of course more populous both in absolute terms and relative to the 
destination country. 
The US experience showed how border control and deportations alone could be challenging and costly 
to pursue, as well as barely effective when demographic and economic differences (between origin 
and destination) are so marked that migratory pressure is destined to last for several generations. This 
may be especially true for those countries of origin in Africa with poor institutional settings and high 
population growth (MEDAM 2018). 
Theoretical and empirical results pointing to a substitution between regular and irregular migration 
all derive from a mix of policies aimed at strengthening enforcement of migration legislation while 
offering concrete and sizeable access to legal labour migration, in order to create the right incentives 
for employers to hire, and migrants to migrate legally. On the contrary, when legal access to labour 
migration is limited then the risk of categorical substitution towards either other legal channels (e.g. 
family and protection) or irregularity is high. Substitution towards family reunification as well as 
irregular channels, for instance, happened for destination countries in western Europe after 
termination of several guest-worker programmes, and also with Maghreb countries (de Haas et al., 
2018).  
                                                          
11 In 1980, the fertility rate in Mexico was 4.8. Latest data from World Bank country profiles for Africa report 4.8 children 
per woman in Senegal, 4.9 in Guinea, 5 in Côte d'Ivoire, 5.5 in Gambia, 5.6 in Nigeria, and 6.1 in Mali. For further 
information see: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57 
12 Between 2008 and 2017, first time permits for occupational reasons issued to African citizens by the EU28 have decreased 
by 66% (83,000 fewer work permits, see Figure 2 above). Irregular migration from Mexico to the US began in 1965 with the 
termination of the Bracero programme, the only significant legal means of entry for low-skilled Mexicans. 
“[T]he era in which immigration levels are rising in a way 
that can feel out-of-control appears to be coming to an end 
in the United States, while it seems to be just beginning in 
the European Union” Hanson and McIntosh (2016) 
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Hence, a policy focusing exclusively on border control may not be effective in curbing irregular 
migration in the long run as the US-Mexico case has shown.13 The plunge in irregular crossing to Italy 
from Libyan shores since July 2017 shows that tightening border control might be more effective in 
the Mediterranean than at the US-Mexico land border. Yet, the humanitarian cost in terms of people 
lost at sea is considerably higher in the Mediterranean. For each year between 2014 and 2018, the 
Mediterranean was the deadliest migratory corridor worldwide, accounting for between 50 and 60 
per cent of all casualties.14  
Our results suggest that relying only on an expansion of legal pathways for labour migration without 
stricter enforcement of control of both borders and employers in the destination countries is also not 
a realistic way to substitute irregular with regular migration. For instance, if – as a thought experiment 
– we take our empirical analysis at face value (i.e. substitution takes place with a ratio of 1:10) and the 
number of irregular crossings to Italy in the first half of 2017 as indication of the current migratory 
pressure from Africa,15 then 1.6 million permits issued by the EU would be necessary to curb irregular 
migration from Africa. However, this amount would be more than ten times higher than the number 
of first time permits issued by the EU for occupational reasons to African citizens in 2010, the record 
year since EU-wide data have been available, with 136,670 permits.16 Yet, this comparison is only 
meant to give an idea of the overall magnitude and on the importance of considering other policy 
elements that could have affected irregular migration and, thus, the extent to which legal 
opportunities can curb it. The analysis, for instance, did not take into account, among others, changes 
in enforcement of border controls or bilateral ties with origin countries.  
All this suggests that it is naïve to think that either legal migration or border control alone will make a 
large impact on irregular migration. Hence, what the EU should replicate from the US, instead, is the 
mix of strict enforcement and targeted access to labour migration during the second phase of the 
Bracero programme and, recently, with a facilitated access and procedures for US employers 
interested in hiring Mexican workers on a temporary basis.  
In this respect, EU member states (especially those most exposed to migratory pressure) should 
streamline their bureaucratic procedures so that incentives for hiring irregularly are low. Taking Italy 
as an example, where a yearly decree (i.e. decreto flussi) sets the quota of permits for third-country 
nationals, only 18,000 of the 30,000 permits foreseen for 2016 were issued, despite 44,000 requests 
from employers. The main reasons for this failure are the long delay in the publication of the yearly 
decree as well as that for issuing the permits themselves. These delays make the policy tool ineffective 
given that the majority of permits requested by employers are for seasonal work in the agriculture 
sector. 17  
Moreover, these kinds of deficiencies – coupled with the significant differences in wages and living 
conditions between origin and destination countries – create incentives for employers and migrants 
to operate outside the law, translating into a higher likelihood for exploitation of migrants and for 
                                                          
13 Massey et al. (2016), Gathmann (2008), Clemens and Gough (2018). 
14 Missing Migrant Project, more information available at: https://missingmigrants.iom.int/ 
15 In the first half of 2017, arrivals in Italy by sea were 83,752, which thus gives an estimate of 167,504 arrivals for the entire 
year against the actual number recorded of 119,369. See UNHCR – Mediterranean Situation, available at 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean  
16 The number of permits estimated would still be eight times higher than the value of 2010 if considering also the 64,093 
permits issued for education purposes that year. 
17 Fabio De Ponte and Raphaël Zanotti, 19/07/2017. “Decreto flussi, ecco i dati del flop. Permesso solo a un richiedente su 
tre”. La Stampa. Available at: http://www.lastampa.it/2017/07/19/italia/cronache/decreto-flussi-ecco-i-dati-del-flop-
permesso-solo-a-un-richiedente-su-tre-s7LjRg6zfe4ewml7Ml8VyN/pagina.html%20 
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negative reactions among citizens of destination countries, fearing unfair competition and objecting 
to ongoing human rights violations within their territory.18 A similar situation characterised the first 
phase of the Bracero programme, when employers were not allowed to re-hire Mexican workers at 
the end of their visa directly in the US due to a common labour pool policy in the programme. Only by 
strengthening controls and enforcing deportations together with introducing the possibility for 
employers to hire named individual workers and renew their contract, were US authorities able to 
curb irregular immigration, which hit a record low in the ten years following these policy changes.19 
5 Conclusions 
To the extent that irregular migration has significant spillovers across EU countries, our analysis has 
implications for the coordination of EU policy in the areas of border control and extending legal 
migration possibilities towards African countries. 
There is already significant cooperation and direct involvement of EU institutions when it comes to 
controlling borders along the Mediterranean Sea. Additional EU money is foreseen for controlling 
external borders in the coming budget period. Since irregular migrants often have northern Europe as 
their final destination, the case for coordination is fairly strong.  
Admitting legal migrants is a member state competence. Given the large differences in structure and 
needs across European countries, the case for EU competence in this area is much weaker (Barslund 
and Busse, 2017). However, since several member states are actively recruiting workers outside the 
EU, there is a case for coordinating this effort centrally with the European Commission as a key actor. 
In fact, the European Commission has launched targeted pilot projects to widen access for labour 
migration in the EU, involving the main African countries of origin and member states interested in 
participating.  
One avenue for scaling up these pilot projects would be the establishment of an EU skills and mobility 
partnership, building on the skill partnership idea of Clemens (2015), and organised as suggested in 
Barslund et al. (2019). Participation would be voluntary, where member states identify labour 
shortages and pledge a number of work permits. The European Commission would act as coordinator, 
identifying possible synergies among needs identified by member states as well as with those of 
African partners. Professional training would be offered in the origin countries and the cost should be 
borne by the EU. Offering training at origin would lower overall costs and the final goal would be to 
train more people than will eventually migrate in order to achieve a sizeable development impact. 
Such a scheme would complement the increased focus on border control and help to better manage 
irregular migration across the Mediterranean.  
                                                          
18 Examples of such type of violations (also targeting minors) are indeed common in the South of Italy where the economy 
relies heavily on the agriculture sector. See: Mary Sottile, 15/02/2017. “Immigrati minorenni sfruttati nei campi”. La Sicilia. 
Available at: http://www.lasicilia.it/news/inchieste/62891/immigrati-minorenni-sfruttati-nei-campi.html; Salvo Palazzolo, 
26/08/2017. “Sicilia, allarme lavoro nero sulla vendemmia. Più di cento braccianti irregolari scoperti in un mese”. La 
Repubblica. Available at: 
http://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2017/08/26/news/sicilia_la_vendemmia_del_caporalato_piu_di_cento_lavoratori_in
_nero_scoperti_in_un_mese-173866300/  
19 See Figure A1 in the Annex. 
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Annexes 
A1. Evidence from US-Mexico case 
Figure A1 Regular migration channels have curbed irregular migration at the US-Mexico border – when 
paired with robust enforcement 
 
Note: “Visas” are low-skill seasonal work visas. 
Source: Clemens and Gough (2018). 
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A2. Evidence of substitution between regular and irregular migration: the case of 
Continental Europe 
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Notes: a) Planned destination country; b) Countries of origin: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYRM, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, and Serbia; c) Permits issued for occupational reasons: seasonal workers and other remunerated activities; d) 
Irregular crossing is based on people detected and refused at the border. 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat. 
 
A3. Econometric analysis of the Africa-EU case  
The panel dataset covers all African countries for the period 2009-2016, for which figures on irregular 
crossing and permits issued are available for each nationality. We do the analysis within a fixed effects 
framework with number of crossing and permits issued entered both in normal (1) and logarithmic 
form (2): 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + α𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1) 
𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + α𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2) 
Where, the dependent variable Irregular crossing is given by the number of people crossing the 
Mediterranean along one of the three routes identified by Frontex (i.e. Central, Western or Eastern 
Med); Permits is the explanatory variable of interest and captures the number of first permits issued 
by the EU for occupational or educational reasons (Eurostat); Governance is a vector including 
different governance indicators of countries of origin; X is a vector including control variables; α is the 
    Permits 
    Irregular  
Poland Greece 
Hungary Romania 
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country-specific time-invariant effect and ε is the residual part of the error term. Subscripts i and t 
refer to country and time respectively. Year fixed effects are included as well (𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡). When it comes to 
the logarithmic form of both Irregular crossing and Permits in equation (2), one unit has been added 
to both variables before taking the logarithm so not to lose observations reporting a zero. 
As regards the Governance vector, we use the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) from the 
World Bank, which is entered in the equation both once as overall score (column 1 and 3 of Table A1 
below) as well as broken down into their different components (column 2 and 4 of Table A1 below): 
• Worldwide governance indicators (WGI) (scale -2.5 to +2.5) 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home): 
o Voice and Accountability; 
o Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; 
o Government Effectiveness; 
o Regulatory Quality; 
o Rule of Law; 
o Control of Corruption; 
o Overall (average of the six indicators); 
As regards vector X including the other control variables, it accounts for differences among countries 
in terms of size and development, as well as for the labour market needs at destination using 
unemployment rate in the EU-15. Specifically, vector X is defined as follows: 
• World Development Indicators: 
o GNI per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $); 
o Log of Population, total; 
o Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita). 
• Eurostat: 
o Unemployment rate of active population (average EU15). 
• Worldwide Governance Indicator for Libya. 
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Table A1 Substitution between regular and irregular migration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Irregular Crossing Irregular Crossing Log of Irregular Crossing 
Log of Irregular 
Crossing 
 (WGI overall) (WGI components) (WGI overall) (WGI components) 
     
Permits -0.152*** -0.124**   
 (0.0565) (0.0575)   
Log of Permits   -0.512** -0.469* 
   (0.258) (0.261) 
World Governance 
Indicator 
    
  Overall 1,575  0.379  
 (1,305)  (0.573)  
  Voice & Accountability  1,796*  0.0168 
  (956.6)  (0.420) 
  Political Stability & 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
 126.6  0.337 
  (616.6)  (0.271) 
  Government Effectiveness  -1,096  -0.132 
  (1,381)  (0.612) 
  Regulatory Quality  -297.3  -0.880 
  (1,364)  (0.591) 
  Control of Corruption  2,557**  1.028* 
  (1,286)  (0.562) 
  Rule of Law  -1,147  -0.440 
  (1,521)  (0.668) 
Other control     
  Libya WGI overall -612.2 -296.9 -0.567 -0.653 
 (1,706) (1,747) (0.739) (0.757) 
  Unemp. Rate (EU15) -382.5 -349.4 -0.153 -0.144 
 (428.5) (426.5) (0.188) (0.189) 
  Cost of business start-up 
procedures 
1.095 0.833 -0.000162 -0.000369 
 (2.422) (2.445) (0.00106) (0.00107) 
  GNI per capita -0.0121 0.0112 -0.000354*** -0.000360*** 
 (0.230) (0.231) (0.000100) (0.000101) 
  Log of Population 11,506 12,476 7.009** 6.726** 
 (7,320) (7,573) (3.178) (3.281) 
Constant -177,727 -193,555 -101.9** -98.18* 
 (117,036) (121,091) (50.57) (52.28) 
     
Observations 345 345 345 345 
R-squared 0.159 0.187 0.444 0.456 
Number of cit 51 51 51 51 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.159 0.187 0.444 0.456 
F-test 4.446 3.759 18.74 13.67 
Note: Testing with the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) instead of the World Bank Governance Indicator does not 
affect the main results, both in terms of coefficient estimate and significance. We further tested a linear model with lagged 
depended variable (using a system dynamic GMM estimator) and a negative binomial model in absolute levels. Both models 
led to similar qualitative results. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
